Promoting Patient Safety and Preventing Medical Error in Emergency Departments by Schenkel, Stephen M.
1204 PATIENT SAFETY Schenkel • PREVENTION OF MEDICAL ERRORS
CONCEPTS
Promoting Patient Safety and Preventing Medical
Error in Emergency Departments
STEPHEN SCHENKEL, MD, MPP
Abstract. An estimated 108,000 people die each
year from potentially preventable iatrogenic injury.
One in 50 hospitalized patients experiences a pre-
ventable adverse event. Up to 3% of these injuries
and events take place in emergency departments.
With long and detailed training, morbidity and mor-
tality conferences, and an emphasis on practitioner
responsibility, medicine has traditionally faced the
challenges of medical error and patient safety
through an approach focused almost exclusively on
individual practitioners. Yet no matter how well
trained and how careful health care providers are,
individuals will make mistakes because they are hu-
man. In general medicine, the study of adverse drug
events has led the way to new methods of error de-
tection and error prevention. A combination of chart
reviews, incident logs, observation, and peer solici-
tation has provided a quantitative tool to demon-
strate the effectiveness of interventions such as com-
puter order entry and pharmacist order review. In
emergency medicine (EM), error detection has fo-
cused on subjects of high liability: missed myocardial
infarctions, missed appendicitis, and misreading of
radiographs. Some system-level efforts in error pre-
vention have focused on teamwork, on strengthening
communication between pharmacists and emergency
physicians, on automating drug dosing and distribu-
tion, and on rationalizing shifts. This article reviews
the definitions, detection, and presentation of error in
medicine and EM. Based on review of the current lit-
erature, recommendations are offered to enhance the
likelihood of reduction of error in EM practice. Key
words: medical errors; prevention; safety; emergency
medicine; adverse events. ACADEMIC EMER-
GENCY MEDICINE 2000; 7:1204–1222
IN THE simplest terms, in the ideal emergencydepartment (ED), the right drug is always
given via the right route to the right patient, dis-
position is always correct, and all likely items on
a patient’s differential diagnosis are considered for
that patient. In the ideal ED, no patient feels for-
gotten, every nurse and every doctor has adequate
support, and every resident and student receives
appropriate supervision. All patients rest secure in
the knowledge that there are no errors.
Unfortunately, this ideal doesn’t exist. Though
doctors, nurses, and staff work to the best of their
abilities, resulting in generally exemplary perfor-
mance, mistakes occur in all parts of medicine. To
change this requires a reevaluation of assumptions
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about medical care, about teaching in medicine,
and about efforts in pursuit of error-free care.
This paper seeks to investigate how best to de-
termine what clinically significant medical errors
occur in EDs and to ascertain what strategies
might be taken to reduce or prevent them. Three
subject areas must be considered regarding the
topic of medical error and patient safety: detection,
teaching, and prevention. This is a somewhat ar-
tificial division—detection is requisite for preven-
tion, interventions designed to detect might also
prevent, and teaching is essential at all levels. The
three are separated to simplify the topic; their in-
teraction is understood.
In order to determine where we should head, it
is essential to know where we begin and what we
already know. This review describes how people
have approached these questions in the past, in
emergency medicine (EM) and elsewhere in medi-
cine.
MEDICAL ERROR IN THE 1990S
In 1994 Lucian Leape called attention to the trou-
bling and complicated topic of error in medicine
with the shocking claim that 180,000 people die of
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iatrogenic injury each year.1 Still more striking
was Leape and colleagues’ claim that as many as
60% of these injuries were due to potentially pre-
ventable errors. These numbers come from the
Harvard Medical Practice Study, a review of more
than 30,000 charts from 51 New York hospitals,
which revealed adverse events in 3.7% of hospital-
izations.2 Other studies have produced similarly
striking results.3–5
Since 1994 there have been a number of efforts
to study adverse events in medicine and establish
strategies to reduce them, including the founding
of the National Patient Safety Foundation as a
branch of the American Medical Association, the
revision of the policy on medical error reporting of
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations, and the establishment of a pa-
tient safety improvement initiative at the Veterans
Administration.6,7
Where does EM fit into this? The Harvard Med-
ical Practice Study reported that 3% of adverse
events uncovered occurred in EDs.8 The reviewers
found a relatively high rate of adverse events due
to negligence, especially associated with misdiag-
nosis, in EDs. They suggested that this was due to
a combination of staffing with part-time physicians
who were not necessarily trained in EM, the speed
with which these physicians were expected to see
patients in a busy ED, and the fact that the sickest
patients tend to pass through the ED.
Error in EM differs from error in the rest of
medicine for a number of reasons. First is the na-
ture of a typical ED, where time pressures are
more intense than on unit floors, and where med-
ical history is less easily accessible than on wards
or in operating rooms. There may not be time in
an ED, for example, for a drug order to receive cen-
tral pharmacy review before delivery.9 Further-
more, inconsistent arrival of patients means that
ED staff may be bored and less attentive during
slow periods or, more likely, harried during busy
periods. In addition, most high-risk patients pass
through an ED on the way into the hospital; these
patients require more individual procedures and
decisions and are, therefore, exposed to more pos-
sibilities for error. As if this were not enough, EDs
tend to be environments in flux, where patients
may be in any of a half-dozen locations—in a room,
in a hallway, in radiology, in CT, in a procedure
room, or in observation—and where staff rotate
every shift. Twenty-four-hour activity makes EDs
prone to the errors that arise from contradicting
our circadian rhythms. This constant activity also
means that there is never a downtime to clean up
or to restore order completely. Thus, preventing er-
ror and ensuring patient safety in an ED may re-
quire different processes from those that work
elsewhere in the hospital.
A FEW NOTES ON THE SCIENCE
OF ERROR
The study of error has its origins as early as the
19th century when Freud investigated the roots of
slips in speech. Further work in psychology contin-
ued through the 20th century, but the application
of error theory to industrial practice had to wait
until 1979 and Three Mile Island.10 At that time,
concerns about nuclear safety and the safety of
commercial aviation led to studies that suggested
a system-level approach could best detect and pre-
vent errors. This meant that rather than looking
at individuals and deeming every incident the re-
sult of a single human’s failing, it was necessary
to dig more deeply into the history of the incident
in order to unearth the many factors that may
have led to conditions setting the stage for the in-
cident.11 One author suggests a Swiss cheese model
to describe the occurrence of error; many layers in
a system work to prevent error and maintain high
quality, but when the holes that inevitably appear
in each layer happen to line up, an incident re-
sults.10
Looking at the systems behind error helped
commercial aviation avoid even a single death in
1998 and, relevant to medicine, allowed anesthesia
to reduce a death rate of one in 20,000 two decades
ago to one in 200,000 today.1,12,13 So strong is sys-
tem-level thinking in industries other than health
care that Paul O’Neill, a chief executive officer
known for marked improvements in workplace
safety in the notably dangerous industry of alu-
minum refining, has stated that ‘‘you can’t make
the safety better without having a profound un-
derstanding of your process, and working with the
idea of continuous improvement.’’14
Some of these ideas from industry regarding er-
ror have long existed in medicine, particularly the
idea of continuous individual improvement. Other
ideas are relatively new: the need for system-wide
thinking, and that error may begin anywhere
within a health care organization. Medicine can
learn much from industrial approaches, and EM
can, in turn, learn a great deal from approaches
elsewhere in medicine.
While examining different approaches to error
and its prevention, Norman’s four points about ob-
ject design should be kept in mind. He begins from
the perspective that humans always err. It is de-
sign, therefore, that must take up the slack. His
four points have been slightly modified here, to ap-
ply to process and to medical care.15,16: 1) Under-
stand the causes of error, and design to minimize
those causes. 2) Make it possible to undo actions
or make it harder to do what cannot be undone. 3)
Make it easier to discover and to correct the errors
that do occur. 4) Change the attitude toward er-
1206 PATIENT SAFETY Schenkel • PREVENTION OF MEDICAL ERRORS
TABLE 1. Methods Used to Find and Quantify
Medical Error
Incident report
Chart review, typically with a three-physician panel
Extensive caretaker observation by trained observers
Daily peer (nurse or housestaff ) solicitation regarding adverse
events or errors
Incident logs placed in unit medical rooms
E-mail solicitation for information regarding adverse events or
errors
Daily reminders and solicitation at morning report
Automated computer screening for indicators of adverse events
or errors
Collection of potential events or ‘‘near misses’’
rors. The admission and study of mistakes are
what permit improvement.
DEFINITIONS, DETECTION, AND
REPORTING OF MEDICAL ERROR
Definitions. A number of methods exist to quan-
tify errors occurring in any given medical system.
The Harvard Medical Practice Study used a two-
physician screening panel to determine whether
charts contained evidence of adverse events and
whether those events ‘‘could have been caused by
a reasonably avoided error, defined as a mistake in
performance or thought.’’2,8 Because it relies on ret-
rospective assertion, hindsight bias—the tendency
to simplify situations examined after knowing the
outcomes—plagues this vague definition of error.
Vague definitions have advantages, though. They
assume that errors occur throughout the health
care system and that health care workers under-
stand intuitively when an error has occurred.
Vague definitions also make specific, quantita-
tive research difficult to conduct. Unfortunately,
discussions of terminology tend to bog down re-
searchers, and actual work becomes hard to carry
out as progress sticks on the need for an exact def-
inition.
Appendix A reproduces, with some modification,
a working definition of medical error developed for
an executive conference at the Kennedy School. It
is specifically designed to drive discussion toward
system-level analysis, to view adverse events as
the possible results of many factors, and to move
discussion beyond the potential swamp of strict def-
inition.
Methods of Detection and Reporting (Table
1). Multiple methods of error detection have pro-
duced varying degrees of success. The system of
incident reporting, the most widespread method,
in one comparative study revealed so few adverse
drug events (approximately 6% of those found via
other methods) as to lead the authors to emphasize
its severe limitations as a reporting tool.17 The au-
thors suggest that by making it easier to report,
changing institutional culture to increase comfort
in reporting, and providing feedback to demon-
strate that reporting leads to changes, hospitals
can improve incident reporting rates. While not
complete, incident reporting can yield a great deal
of information. Working only from nurses’ incident
reports, Groves et al. discovered unintentional in-
cidents, including falls and medication errors, for
2.2% of admitted patients.18
Dubois and Brook developed a method of chart
review using three-physician panels to determine
preventable deaths in hospitalized patients.19 Lo-
calio et al. later raised doubts about the utility of
panels.20 In reviews of 7,533 patient records, with
two physicians independently reviewing each rec-
ord, one physician determined that an adverse
event was more likely than not, while the second
physician deemed the case free of adverse events,
in 12.9% of cases. Two physicians agreed that an
adverse event had occurred in only 10% of cases.
The two physicians, in other words, disagreed
more often than they agreed.
Introducing a different approach, Andrews et
al. hired four observers to spend nine months at-
tending regularly scheduled patient care meetings
including work rounds, attending rounds, confer-
ences, and shift changes.21 Any time an adverse
event was discussed, the observers noted the
event, its apparent cause, its effects, and whether
anyone was blamed. Their goal was not necessarily
to uncover preventable error, but to develop a cat-
alog of adverse events, their causes, and their out-
comes.
Cullen et al. used three methods to collect evi-
dence of adverse events: self-reporting in incident
logs; a peer—in this case, a nurse investigator—
who once or twice daily visited unit nursing sta-
tions to solicit information regarding adverse
events; and chart review.17 Review of medication
sheets has also been noted as a productive method
of uncovering errors.22
O’Neil et al. compared chart review with confi-
dential housestaff self-reporting through electronic
mail or written report deposited in a collection
box.4 The two methods turned up similar numbers
of events, though the events reported by housestaff
proved more amenable to preventive efforts. Self-
report also turned out to be substantially less ex-
pensive than chart review. A separate study found
that daily reminders at morning report, combined
with reporting via a patient log traditionally filled
out at morning report, doubled the number of
events reported in the hospital overall and in-
creased eightfold the number of housestaff-
reported events.23
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TABLE 2. Reasons Why Medicine Might Be Prone to Error
High complexity
Lack of standardization
Failure to design with error in mind
A medical culture that resists admitting to error and so cannot
work to prevent error
TABLE 3. Traditional Methods for Error Detection, Teaching,
and Prevention in Medicine
Autopsy
Incident reports followed by case investigation
Long and detailed training
Continuing medical education throughout career
Morbidity and mortality conferences
Strong sense of personal responsibility
Legal system designed to root out and punish error
The use of computers for both order entry and
patient record storage raises the possibility of com-
puterized review as a first step to determine the
presence of error. Using three different identifica-
tion algorithms, Bates et al. judged that more than
50%, and up to 89%, of adverse events were poten-
tially identifiable electronically.24 As much as 23%
of the adverse events judged identifiable were also
deemed preventable.
Putting screening systems in place is more dif-
ficult, however, as softer criteria pick up more false
positives along with adverse events. After exam-
ining 15 screening criteria, Bates et al. concluded
that no small subset could reliably detect a high
percentage of adverse events, much less errors.25
They pointed out that screening methods are at an
early stage of development and will become more
sophisticated as more data become available on-
line. LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City had better
results with a more specific system screening ex-
clusively for adverse drug events.26 Criteria in-
cluded dosage decreases, ordering of antidotes, and
laboratory tests for drug levels.
In an atmosphere where actual error is difficult
to discuss or raises questions of liability, more suc-
cess might be had asking about potential errors or
‘‘near misses.’’ For example, pharmacy review of
entered orders can detect potential medication er-
rors—errors that are caught and corrected—col-
lecting them for categorization and analysis.27,28 In-
deed, one can modify all methods of error collection
to collect near misses. Rather than asking house-
staff to report patients who were injured as a re-
sult of care, for example, one might ask about pa-
tients who might have been injured but for some
fortuitous realization. In this regard, it is notable
that the aviation reporting system collects more in-
formation on incidents where safety is threatened
than on incidents where physical harm occurs.29
GENERAL APPROACHES TO ERROR
IN MEDICINE
Is there more error in medicine than in any other
field? The question provokes argument but has
generated little research. Numerous reasons do ex-
ist (Table 2), however, suggesting why the practice
of medicine might entail a higher incidence of er-
rors.1,30 First among these is the complexity of
medical practice. Doctors, nurses, pharmacists,
and other health care workers likely err no more
than individuals outside of hospitals, but each pa-
tient who encounters the medical system receives
attention from multiple people performing multi-
ple tasks. One analysis in a medical intensive care
unit (ICU) discovered that each patient was the
subject of 178 distinct activities—including receiv-
ing medications, visits from physicians, and gen-
eral nursing care—during each 24 hours.30 Even if
99% of tasks were performed perfectly, this still
meant that each patient was the recipient of more
than one error, on average, every day.
Leape has suggested that a central reason why
the medical community has not tackled this sub-
ject more strongly lies in a medical culture that
imbues caretakers with a belief that they must be
infallible and that associates error with negli-
gence. This culture leaves little room for the ex-
amination of error and less room for the expiation
of the individual who, as all will, makes one.1,31 A
series of focus groups conducted at three different
health care organizations recently confirmed
Leape’s perspective. Though staff reported a trend
in health care to move away from blaming employ-
ees, they wondered how an organization could both
hold individuals accountable and be nonpunitive.32
Traditional Methods for Error Detection, Teach-
ing, and Prevention. Medicine has a number of
traditional methods for the detection and preven-
tion of error, as well as for teaching about error,
that are worth considering for several reasons (Ta-
ble 3). First, these methods provide a sense of the
traditional importance of this topic to medicine.
Second, they allow us to gain a sense of where
medicine has succeeded and where it has failed in
the prevention of error. Third, they provide a foun-
dation on which to establish new practices.
Detection. Autopsy is a traditional and powerful
method of evaluating diagnostic accuracy. Several
studies have taken the next step to look at error
as a reason for misdiagnosis. A 1957 study of 1,106
autopsies revealed a 6% misdiagnosis rate at one
Veterans Administration hospital, half of which
were attributed to potentially avoidable errors of
omission.33 A more recent Veterans Administration
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study revealed a 13% rate of major clinical errors,
defined as inappropriate therapy possibly leading
to the patient’s death, though no attempt was
made to distinguish treatment errors that might
reasonably have been avoided from those that
could not.34 Despite calls for a return to more fre-
quent use, the autopsy rate has declined substan-
tially over the last few decades.35
Autopsy is not unknown in EM. In 1990, from
a series of 244 autopsies, Burke et al. reported a
4% rate of major unexpected findings and a 5.8%
rate of minor unexpected findings.36 A 1994 study
in a pediatric ED uncovered a 15% rate of major
diagnostic disagreement between clinical and au-
topsy diagnoses, none of which were thought likely
to have led to cure or prolonged survival if discov-
ered in time.37 Neither study distinguished poten-
tially preventable diagnostic error from unavoida-
ble misdiagnosis.
In addition to autopsy, incident reports, which
require self-admission of error, permit individual
case review. Some argue that few incidents go un-
reported because the nursing profession, espe-
cially, emphasizes the important role of reporting
and because the sanctions for concealing an inci-
dent outweigh those for admission.18 As the follow-
ing discussion reveals, however, empirical evidence
strongly suggests that written incident reports
may not provide a complete accounting.17
Teaching. Long and detailed training is a fun-
damental method of error prevention for physi-
cians and, with less emphasis on length but more
on explicitly delineated duties, for nurses. So en-
trenched is this notion that Rosen et al. write ‘‘the
true point to a residency is to avoid repeating pre-
ventable errors.’’38 Professional continuing educa-
tion throughout one’s career augments this long
training. Both of these methods focus exclusively
on the individual as the source of error and there-
fore as the solution.
Morbidity and mortality conferences (M & Ms)
tend to focus on the individual as well, often with
one person assuming responsibility by presenting
the case before a committee of demanding critics.
Morbidity and mortality conferences, though, can
be broadened to examine many components of clin-
ical care, including explicit discussion of error pre-
vention, communication among actors, and sys-
tems failures that contributed to an event.39,40 Such
broadening helps M & Ms overcome limitations
such as a tendency toward fault-finding and an
emphasis on outliers.41
Prevention. The strong sense of personal respon-
sibility imbued during medical training might ap-
pear on both a list of practices that prevent error
and a list of practices that make medicine prone to
error. The excessive care taken when one’s self-as-
surance and reputation are constantly at stake
probably lowers the error rate for individual tasks
in medicine. Unfortunately, vigilance has its limits.
This sense of personal responsibility also prohibits
easy admission of error and, consequently, compli-
cates the collection and analysis of error.
Whether the tort system works beneficially to
prevent error by enforcing a high degree of indi-
vidual responsibility or whether it promotes an at-
mosphere of fear in which free discussion becomes
impossible is a matter of debate. It has, nonethe-
less, generated a method of targeted examination
in the form of closed case analysis.42,43
It is interesting to consider traditional mecha-
nisms of error detection and prevention in light
of the lessons that one author says we can learn
by examining high reliability organizations. Gra-
bowski and Roberts state that the need for good
communication cannot be overemphasized, that or-
ganizations require flexible structures to adapt to
environmental changes, that a strong organiza-
tional culture emphasizing norms of safety is es-
sential, and that one must pay attention to the in-
terfaces in the system.44 In concentrating on
individual propensity for error, most of medicine’s
traditional methods fall short. They may yield a
safer system if pushed further and broadened; an-
other approach, however, is to redesign the pro-
cesses of care to include system-level methods of
both error detection and prevention.
Adverse Drug Events: Examples Illustrating
System-level Approaches. The Harvard Medical
Practice Study revealed that the largest number of
adverse events in medical care occur around the
ordering and delivery of medication.2 Adverse drug
events, though, while relatively common and easy
to identify, do not imply error. They can be normal
complications of care.
A further study concluded that adverse drug
events nearly double the length of stay and the
risk of death in hospitalized patients.45 One-half of
the events were preventable. Bates et al., working
in a teaching hospital, revealed a rate of 6.5 ad-
verse drug events per 100 admissions, of which
28% were preventable.46
Evans et al. examined computer-assisted man-
agement of antibiotic choices in ICU patients.47 A
combination of computer order entry and assisted
decision making reduced overall adverse events
secondary to drugs ordered, including instances in
which a patient received a drug known to have
precipitated an allergic reaction in the past. The
combination of online medical records, up-to-date
pharmaceutical recommendations, and use of the
most immediately available patient information
makes this system a model for what is possible
with computer-based drug ordering.
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Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center in
Phoenix reported that a computer alert system, us-
ing 37 rules to trigger real-time computer order
entry responses, alerted physicians to the potential
for adverse drug event-related injury in 64 of every
1,000 patient admissions.48 The authors concluded
that such decision support systems provide critical
information at appropriate times, benefiting pa-
tient care while also being cost-effective.
A multicenter study in the reduction of adverse
drug events developed a series of approaches to im-
prove the ordering, dispensing, and administration
of medications.49 The approaches included efforts
to reduce reliance on memory by using preprinted
orders and computer order entry; simplification by
limiting the number of drugs on formulary and
moving intravenous (IV) admixture to the phar-
macy; and standardization by restricting the num-
ber of dosing options for specific drugs. Other
methods entailed using protocols and checklists for
hazardous drugs, having pharmacists round with
doctors and nurses, and eliminating look-alike
drugs by repackaging where necessary to call at-
tention to easily confused medications.
METHODS OF ERROR EVALUATION
SPECIFIC TO EM
Rosen and colleagues noted in 1983 that, since its
inception as a specialty, EM has reflected on med-
ical error and taken innovative approaches to its
prevention. First among these was calling for 24-
hour on-site attending coverage during resident
training specifically ‘‘to minimize or avert technical
error.’’38,50 This intervention has been credited with
averting 17 life- or limb-threatening errors in a
sample of 1,000 patients seen by non-EM resi-
dents.51
What follows is a review of approaches to med-
ical error and patient safety used and studied in
EM. Presented are methods of detection, both nar-
rowly targeted and more general; methods of
teaching; and system-level approaches to preven-
tion of error in EDs.
Detection and Reporting.
Targeted Approaches. Several areas in EM, typ-
ically described by diagnoses, have garnered atten-
tion for highly focused research. Among these are
missed myocardial infarctions (MIs), appendicitis,
and trauma, areas that suggest measures for
tracking error.
Missed MIs. McCarthy et al. found from a
sample of 1,050 patients with acute MI that 20, or
1.9%, were not admitted to the hospital at initial
presentation in the ED.52 Examination of ED rec-
ords revealed that half of the episodes of missed
MI were preventable based on what was known in
the ED at the time.
Targeted, retrospective studies, however, have
several limitations, chief of which is the hindsight
bias to which any retrospective approach is prone.
It is exceptionally difficult to reproduce the condi-
tions that lead to a clinical decision. Knowledge of
the outcome biases one’s judgment of the processes
producing that outcome, reducing the number of
possibilities considered from the original informa-
tion and making what was difficult to determine a
priori seem obvious ex post facto.53
Appendicitis. Rothrock et al. illustrated an-
other approach in their study of misdiagnosed ap-
pendicitis in children under the age of 13 years.54
They retrospectively examined 181 cases of surgi-
cally treated appendicitis, 50 of which were mis-
diagnosed at initial presentation, seeking to deter-
mine what complicated early recognition.
This approach can be difficult to generalize be-
cause initial examinations may have taken place
outside hospitals or clinics. Nonetheless, the rate
at which a relatively common, probable diagnosis
is missed on initial presentation is an adverse
event measure. The frequency of misdiagnosis due
to avoidable error is a refinement that requires
chart review and may be subject to disagreement
among reviewers.
Trauma. Treatment of trauma is central to
EM, as is examination of the accuracy of that treat-
ment.55 One method used to assess diagnostic ac-
curacy consists of comparing injury severity scores
calculated for patients at the time of ED presen-
tation with a severity score calculated from final
diagnoses at discharge or death. A discrepancy be-
tween scores is taken as evidence of diagnostic er-
ror. Tulloh used this method to demonstrate a 29%
discrepancy rate in a series of 203 head-injured pa-
tients.56 Inaccurate reading of radiographs ac-
counted for most of the misdiagnoses. Greater dis-
crepancies were found in patients who were
comatose on presentation, defined by a Glascow
Coma Scale score (GCS) of less than 8. While the
comparison of severity scores gives little indication
of the clinical import of the discrepancy, it provides
a mechanism for detecting both over- and under-
diagnosis. Additionally, this study suggests the use
of a patient’s initial GCS as a predictor of misdi-
agnosis.
System-level Approaches.
Radiology Reviews. Because of the importance
of missed fractures to ED malpractice claims, and
the centrality of imaging to emergency diagnoses,
radiographic interpretation is a clear topic for
study in EM.57 It is also a Joint Commission re-
quirement.
One review of 12,099 radiographs found that at-
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tending emergency physicians (EPs) and radiolo-
gists had discordant readings only 1% of the time,
and then only one-half of these misses necessitated
clinical follow-up.58 Gratton et al. found a 2.8% rate
of clinically significant errors in an EM residency
program.59 The investigators pointed out difficulty
in using such ratings as quality measures because
the results varied depending on definition and
whether one included borderline cases in rate cal-
culations.
Pediatric ED analysis of 1,471 radiographs re-
vealed a clinically significant misread rate of 1.4%,
with attending physicians having a slightly lower
rate than housestaff and with both having the
highest error rate in reading extremity films.60
Cranial computed tomography (CT) scans in a
study of 555 films had a much higher discordance
rate than plain films when read by both EPs and
radiologists. Clinically significant misinterpreta-
tions were found in 24.1% of cases, though only a
much smaller 0.6% of patients were managed in-
appropriately following these misinterpretations,
and none had adverse outcomes.61
Literature review reveals a few prospective
studies of interventions designed to reduce reading
error. One might imagine several interventions,
ranging from 24-hour radiologist review, to stan-
dardized checklists for high-risk misreadings, to
regular conferences designed to prevent those er-
rors that have been noted to occur. Preston et al.
reported that a continuous quality improvement
intervention designed to strengthen physician
communication and increase radiologist availabil-
ity for consultation succeeded in a 40% reduction
of patient callbacks.62 Mann and Danz examined
the effect of assigning radiology residents to
month-long dedicated nighttime swing rotations.63
Residents freed from daytime duties missed fewer
radiological diagnoses than residents covering the
ED on-call after a full day of work, a result the
investigators believed was due to the residents’
getting more sleep.
Computer-based Medical Records. Though
medical quality assessment has used administra-
tive data since the 1970s, their use has fallen short
of expectations.64 In an effort to foster the collec-
tion of clinical data in EM, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention have sponsored an effort
to develop uniform standards for computer ED rec-
ords.65 Which elements of this data set will be most
applicable to the study of patient safety remains
to be determined.
In the meantime, an ED with fully computer-
ized records has an opportunity to develop error
detection methods using both administrative and
patient care data. A number of studies suggest
measures with which to begin, primary among
these being unexpected returns. Keith et al. found
that almost 40% of patients who made unsched-
uled return visits to a Detroit ED within 72 hours
of their initial visits did so for avoidable reasons:
a deficiency in medical management, in prescribed
follow-up, in patient education, or in patient com-
pliance.66 Eighty-five percent of these visits oc-
curred in the first 48 hours, implying that a two-
day time frame may be sufficient for data
collection. The authors suggest developing a more
efficient method of detection by conducting a single
month-long chart review in order to determine
high-risk categories; these high-risk categories can
then be used to refine continuing searches and
analyses. Pierce et al., using a two-day criterion,
found a 3% return rate from 17,000 visits.67 Ten
percent of returns were deemed due to error in di-
agnosis, treatment, or disposition. Patients return-
ing for one of these three reasons were more likely
than other returnees to require hospitalization.
Another potential indicator lies in comparison
of ED admission diagnoses with hospital discharge
diagnoses. With fully computerized ED charting
and online hospital discharge summaries, such
comparisons become feasible and their follow-up
record reviews simpler. Kothari et al. used this
method to examine the accuracy of EPs in diag-
nosing stroke.68 Warner and Peabody used it to de-
termine the accuracy of emergency psychiatric di-
agnosis.69
Fully computerized medical records also raise
the possibility of easier hospital-to-hospital trans-
fer of information. A Boston group hopes to estab-
lish a system of shared medical records through
the World Wide Web with the goal of providing
rapid access to information during an emergency.70
The benefits of a readily available medical history
to the prevention of error are obvious. The resis-
tance to such a system lies in the risk to confiden-
tiality.
Finally, increasing use of computers in EM sug-
gests a natural transition to a smart medical rec-
ord that requests appropriate information and
prompts appropriate action.71 A group at UCLA
generated substantial increases in documentation
and compliance with recommendations for testing,
with no increase in per-patient cost, through the
use of a computer-based guideline for the treat-
ment of health care workers after occupational ex-
posure to body fluids.72,73 Implemented in a busy
ED, this study illustrated the feasibility of com-
puter-based interactive guidelines.
Teaching about Error. Drawing from the re-
sults of a questionnaire completed by 114 internal
medicine houseofficers, Wu et al. suggested that
encouraging discussion of mistakes with attending
physicians along with encouraging acceptance of
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responsibility with a view toward constructive
change would better equip residents to learn from
mistakes made during training.74 They believed
that medical educators have a role in dispensing
specific advice about preventing a second occur-
rence of the mistake, providing emotional support,
and helping residents interpret the feelings of dis-
tress that are part of learning from error.75 These
approaches would differ greatly from what Mizrahi
observed during a sociological study of graduate
medical education: ‘‘Little in their 3 year graduate
program allowed them to work through the atten-
dant vulnerability and ambiguity accompanying
the managing of mistakes.’’76
To the best of my knowledge, no equivalent
studies have been undertaken in EM. Two inno-
vative approaches to error and teaching used in
EM are video recording and simulation.
Video Recording. After using videotape to review
73 trauma resuscitations, Santora et al. concluded
that this was an effective method both for teaching
residents and for detection of system problems.77
Videotape provided an opportunity for reflection
and analysis in a controlled environment while
also providing a relatively complete record that al-
lowed the review team to detect subtle system de-
ficiencies—inconvenient locations of supplies and
inefficient intravenous equipment access, for ex-
ample—that might otherwise be missed. Counting
deviations from Advanced Trauma Life Support
protocols provided a quantitative measure of per-
formance. Hoyt et al. reported, after three and a
half years of incorporating videotape into trauma
rounds, that the method allowed feedback not only
on individual adherence to assigned responsibili-
ties and resuscitation priorities, both of which im-
proved, but also on the relationship among mem-
bers of the trauma team.78 Disadvantages noted in
the use of videotape include that it can be tedious
and time-consuming and miss bits of sound and
pieces of the field.79 As for the question of medico-
legal liability, Hoyt et al. received the advice that
so long as patient anonymity was maintained, use
of video was not a problem.78
Simulation. Simulation can refer to anything
from interactive question-and-answer re-creation
of a patient encounter to technologically advanced
models of operating rooms where lifelike, com-
puter-controlled manikins assume the roles of pa-
tients.80 Recent interest borrows from aviation, us-
ing simulation in teaching not only physical skills
but also teamwork and communication skills. An-
esthesia has led the way, using screen-based sim-
ulation to look at the effectiveness of Advanced
Cardiac Life Support training in individuals and
using full-sized operating suites to examine and
train the interpersonal aspects—team composi-
tion, attitudes, and intergroup norms, for example
—involved in team-based medical care.81–83 The
field has generated sufficient interest to establish
several high-fidelity anesthesia simulators and at
least one company that markets simulators for
procedural training in IV catheterization and en-
doscopy.84,85
Basic life support courses for both laypersons
and professionals have used manikins to teach pro-
cedural skills. Eberle et al. called the value of even
this established method into question when they
reported that 45% of emergency medical techni-
cians and paramedics failed to recognize a carotid
pulse in anesthetized patients.86 They questioned
whether overreliance on unrealistic manikins
might work against the acquisition of clinical skills
and increase error by training with inappropriate
feedback. Other procedural uses of manikin simu-
lators in EM include testing houseofficer and at-
tending physician skill at auscultating cardiac
murmurs and teaching the skills of cricothyroid-
otomy and thoracotomy.87,88 The development of
virtual-reality simulators, which would immerse
the trainee in a three-dimensional computer-gen-
erated environment, suggest where such efforts
might head, though the development of such pro-
grams is expensive and the true educational ben-
efits have yet to be established.88
Preventing Error: System-level Approaches.
Teamwork. In aviation, much work in simulation
goes hand in hand with the study of teamwork.
This was the result of research into commercial
airline crashes revealing that human error ac-
counted for a majority of incidents and that inter-
personal failure—failures in leadership, commu-
nication, decision making, or group awareness of
the situation—explained the majority of human
error.84 Helmreich and Schaefer found similar
causes for error in the operating room.83
Extensive work has been conducted analyzing
the role of patient care teams in the care of trauma
and stroke patients.89–91 Somewhat less work has
been done examining the role of teamwork and er-
ror in EM as a whole. Recently, Jay et al. reported
that a retrospective review of 54 malpractice cases
revealed an average of nine teamwork failures per
case.92
Human factors experts note that medicine has
tended to focus on technical proficiency more than
the dynamics of human interaction. They call for
more attention to the latter:
In safety sensitive cultures such as operative or emer-
gency medicine, information flow is critical. . . . Ideas
and concepts must be actively sought, discussed and
evaluated without regard for the status of the person
or group having such information. . . . In view of the
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fact that communication is at the heart of every team’s
activity, it is surprising how little attention this pro-
cess factor has gained in the medical literature.93
They call for an examination of the ‘‘cultural shell’’
in which teams operate, with more detailed atten-
tion paid to communication among team members.
A group working with Dynamics Research Cor-
poration in Andover, Massachusetts, is working to
translate lessons from U.S. Army aviation to emer-
gency care. Using skill- and behavior-oriented
methods designed to promote effective interaction,
methods such as verbal order check-backs and two-
challenge rules, they hope to demonstrate efficacy
through measures of team behavior, attitudes and
opinions, and ED performance.94 Reduction of med-
ical error is one of the principal aims of these ef-
forts.
Pharmacy and Prescribing in the ED. Wingert et
al. found that of 2,213 prescriptions written by
housestaff in a California pediatric ED, 33% con-
tained dosing errors and 95% were incomplete ac-
cording to the broader specifications that all pre-
scriptions contain medication quantity, dosage,
interval between doses or hours to be given, and
any appropriate special instructions.95 Pharma-
cists corrected dosing errors less than 10% of the
time; most errors made their ways to patients’
medicine cabinets.
Johnson et al. telephoned the caregivers, typi-
cally parents, of 192 discharged pediatric inpa-
tients and asked them to read the labels from re-
ceived prescription medications.96 Comparing
these conversations with copies of the original pre-
scriptions and discharge instructions, they de-
tected discrepancies in 12%. Half of the discrep-
ancies arose from errors in the original
prescriptions. Transcription errors caused dis-
charge instruction sheets to differ from prescrip-
tions in another 3% of cases. Patients also received
medications packaged differently than discharge
instructions assumed, thereby increasing the risk
of error with new confusion. These results suggest
that proxy measures of error might be obtained by
asking patients, during routine follow-up after an
ED visit, to read the labels of received prescrip-
tions over the telephone and comparing them with
ED records.
Herr et al. prospectively studied potential ad-
verse drug interactions through the use of a drug
interaction database into which were entered a pa-
tient’s current medications and any new medica-
tions delivered in the ED.97 They found that of 199
visits, 26% of ED patients were exposed to poten-
tial adverse drug interactions and 3% had clini-
cally significant responses as determined by a
three-member physician review panel. Using a ret-
rospective design, Beers et al. revealed a 10% rate
of exposure to potential adverse drug interactions
among ED patients who received at least one pre-
scription.98 Furthermore, the authors found little
in patient charts to indicate that the prescribing
physicians recognized the potential for adverse in-
teractions; therefore, any interaction would have
been the result of error. The high percentages of
potential adverse events highlight the benefit of an
interactive charting system able to call attention
to known drug interactions.
A number of hospitals have experimented with
24-hour on-call pharmacy consult services or
placed a pharmacist in an ED for part or all of the
day.9,99–101 Berry et al. reported that a clinical phar-
macist consultation service yielded consultation in
3% of all ED cases.102 More frequent use of the ser-
vice occurred during July, suggesting a benefit for
new housestaff. They did not, however, measure
error prevented through pharmacy intervention.
Powell et al. described a 24-hour satellite phar-
macy in a 75-bed ED.103 From the satellite, phar-
macists mixed and distributed drugs, tracked in-
ventory, took part in work rounds, instructed
students and residents, and concurrently reviewed
all medication orders. They described substantial
benefits to patient care from pharmacists’ clinical,
distributive, and educational services. Whalen de-
scribed a combined outpatient and ED services
pharmacy that proved cost-effective while increas-
ing physician confidence that patients were filling
their prescriptions.100
Though not conducted in an ED, a study by
Bates et al. sheds light on the relative contribu-
tions of computer order entry and increased avail-
ability of pharmacists at points of medication or-
dering.104 Computerized physician order entry was
implemented in eight hospital units, including
medical, surgical, and ICU wards, with a team in-
tervention also implemented in half the units. The
team intervention included increasing communi-
cation between nursing staff and pharmacy via
written logs and changing pharmacists’ schedules
to permit more of a physical presence, including
daily rounds with the ICU study team. A combi-
nation of incident reporting, twice daily solicitation
of information from nurses, pharmacists, and cler-
ical personnel, and daily review of all patient
charts determined rates of preventable medication
errors and potential adverse drug events. Overall,
the physician order entry system prevented 55% of
serious medication errors, a combination of an 84%
drop in non-intercepted potential adverse drug
events and a 17% drop in preventable adverse drug
events. In other words, the system reduced error,
though with a larger decrease in potential adverse
drug events than in errors that actually led to
events. There was no significant difference in error
reduction rates between physician order entry plus
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team intervention and physician order entry with-
out increased pharmacist availability. The authors
noted that the success of physician order entry
may have overshadowed any effect of the team in-
tervention.
Automated Drug Dosing and Distribution.
Systems are being developed to automate drug
dosing and delivery. One such system is the Pyxis
automated drug delivery system (Pyxis Corpora-
tion, San Diego, CA).105,106 Its advertised advan-
tages include controlled access to medications and
improved reporting of medication use with auto-
mated charting. The use of bar code technology for
dispenser refilling suggests the ability to prevent
error through better inventory control. It also her-
alds the use of bar code verification at the bedside.
In discussing the experience of installing an au-
tomated system, Magnus raised the important risk
of creating error while establishing systems de-
signed to streamline processes.107 He suggested
regular interdepartmental meetings to discuss
who will have access to the machine, what medi-
cations will be stocked, and when restocking
should take place. He warned that problems will
occur, specifically with passwords that may be for-
gotten, with mechanisms that can jam, and with
routines that have yet to be established. The over-
all lesson of his laundry list of warnings is that
system-wide interventions have system-wide ef-
fects. Though these effects are expected, interde-
partmental planning and cooperation can help
smooth the way to successful implementation and
error reduction.
The Organization of Shifts. The nature of EM as
shiftwork is one of the features that sets it apart
from much of the medical world. Examination of
shiftwork in industry has revealed that it creates
risks to shiftworkers’ emotional states and physi-
cal well-being.108 Increased incidences of single-ve-
hicle car and truck collisions, gas company meter-
reading errors, and even engineering disasters
have been noted to occur at predictable times in
the early morning and early afternoon.109 This re-
search has informed recommendations in EM for
eight- or ten-hour shifts, isolated single night
shifts or designated long periods of night shifts,
clockwise rotation of shifts, and physiologic eating
patterns.110,111
Comparatively little work has been done to look
at the process of shift change beyond determining
that EPs, when asked, cited erratic schedules and
shift changes as stressors in ED work.112 Macias et
al. determined that hospital employees had a
higher rate of exposure to biological fluids, such as
needlesticks and splashes, during the first hour of
any shift and during the last two hours of a 12-
hour shift.113 While the results presented are gen-
eralized, with only a fourth of incidents arising in
an ED, this study suggests the challenges inherent
in shiftwork and the lapses that can occur around
change of shift. In addition, it suggests a proxy
measure for ED safety in tracking the rate of staff
exposure to biological hazards.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Beyond simply preventing error, recommendations
must seek to foster the development of a culture of
safety in EDs. Hopefully, medicine will eventually
view error with the same wisdom that aviation
views error: knowing that it exists while seeking
constantly—through the most effective means
known—to prevent any ill effects. For this to oc-
cur, patient safety must become part of the every-
day thought of ED physicians, nurses, and staff.
Recommendations to reduce error within an ED
must consider114:
• The mission of the ED, within its local commu-
nity.
• The technical and organizational constraints of
the ED.
• The politics that surround error in medicine and
patient safety.
Though a movement in patient safety is gaining
momentum, there are significant barriers to pro-
gress. Among these barriers are 1) the underlying
threat of malpractice litigation after having re-
vealed one’s own mistakes, 2) the more subtle
threat of professional disrepute as one appears to
err more frequently than quieter colleagues, and
3) the traditional medical focus on individual re-
sponsibility to the exclusion of system-level
thought. To approach the vision of error-free care
requires action in the overlapping areas of detec-
tion, teaching, prevention, and research.
Detection and Reporting.
Develop, Establish, and Follow a Few Specific
Indicators of Patient Safety and Medical Er-
ror. Any quantitative measure of error, in order
to suffice for general quality assurance as well as
support prospective research into methods of error
prevention, should be reliable, allow consistent
comparison over time, be specific to the ED, and
be easily understood as measuring error.
Tables 4 and 5 present a selection of measures
of error. Ideally, a single, obvious measure would
define patient safety in the ED. Industry has ac-
complished this with measures such as number of
serious injuries per 100,000 worker hours.115
Chart-based Methods. Physician or nurse
panel review, automated review, and the use of
proxy measures are all based on analysis of patient
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TABLE 4. Measures of Patient Safety and Medical Error
Based on Chart Review
Unexpected patient returns to the emergency department (ED)
in under 48 hours
Discharge diagnoses differing from ED disposition diagnoses
Percentage of patients admitted to the floor who are subse-
quently transferred to an intensive care unit
Unexpected events based on automated review of a sample of
charts using multiple, targeted criteria
Episodes of adverse events or preventable error noted on phy-
sician panel chart review
TABLE 5. Measures of Patient Safety and Medical Error
Based on Other Methods
Tally of incident reports
Tally of self-reports via e-mail or error logs
Tally of events reported with peer solicitation
Survey of primary care physicians as to whether patients have
experienced any unexpected events following an emergency
department (ED) visit
Staff perception scale of safety in the ED
Percentage of radiographs read requiring patient recalls
Percentage of electrocardiograms read requiring patient recalls
Percentage of discharged patients reporting adverse event, in-
jury, or error on follow-up call
Percentage of autopsy diagnoses differing from ED diagnoses
for patients dying within 48 hours of ED visit
charts. None of these methods permits absolute re-
liability, reproducibility, and validity. Neither, in
the young field of patient safety, has any been
widely demonstrated or applied in EM. All three
methods, however, are a step forward in the de-
velopment of more reliable indicators. They may
also be used in combination with one another.
Chart review by a physician or nurse panel al-
lows one to quantify episodes of adverse events and
preventable error over time. This approach can be
problematic. It is expensive except for small sam-
ples, too few data may be produced to demonstrate
a significant difference, and review teams will pro-
duce inconsistent assessments unless the same
panel carries out the analysis each time.
Automated chart review can make use of com-
puterized medical records. Target criteria for the
Harvard Medical Practice Study that might be au-
tomated included death during hospitalization or
transfer to an ICU.116 A targeted, automated chart
review generates reproducible data. The difficulty
lies in determining measures with sufficient sen-
sitivity and specificity to indicate error rather than
normal care.
A two-stage method uses automated review first
to find cases that likely contain adverse events.
Physician review follows in order to determine
whether the high-probability cases actually con-
tain notable events or error.
Bates et al. tested a different two-stage refine-
ment for hospital inpatients. They ran electronic
screens to find surgical patients who were read-
mitted to the hospital or returned to the operating
room, both suggestive of adverse events. Then, at
the patient’s discharge, they asked residents
whether these returns were unexpected.117
Whether an equivalent method might work in an
ED, where one physician may see more than 25
patients in a shift, has not been investigated.
Finally, single proxy measures, such as per-
centage of ED return visits less than 48 hours, can
indicate patient safety. One disadvantage of indi-
vidual proxy measures is that they may retain only
a distant connection with error, making them dif-
ficult to analyze and explain. Patient satisfaction,
for example, a notable goal in its own right, may
less accurately report safety than good impressions
made through well-appointed rooms or kind words.
Self-report. Incident reports and peer solici-
tation of events all require ED staff self-reporting.
The number of events reported depends on percep-
tions of punishment or reward for reporting and
on personal evaluations of any positive outcome. To
maximize self-reporting requires acknowledge-
ment of reports and clear demonstration of an in-
terest in working to implement the changes sug-
gested. Punitive actions following on self-report
will diminish the number of reports received.
Taking a cue from research in industrial inci-
dents, ideally all reports should be kept in narra-
tive form, in a computer database, in order to allow
text word searches and accurate reconstruction of
the events in future analyses.118 There is, however,
a danger in this approach. In theory, incident re-
ports, as peer review documents, are not discov-
erable as legal evidence. This doctrine has been
challenged repeatedly in court. Leaving a paper
trail of error, while essential to improving prac-
tices, requires sound legal guidance.
Staff Survey. A regular staff survey allows
quantitative evaluation of subjective perception.
Staff perceptions, however, may change from day
to day or even from hour to hour depending on the
volume in the ED and the complexity of the last
few patients seen. Nonetheless, a short survey pro-
vides an inexpensive and simple method to moni-
tor patient safety. With a large percentage of ED
staff surveyed, it may show changes in perception
from month to month, tracking the success of any
system implemented. Complications in interpre-
tation of a subjective survey include that it may
demonstrate a strong tendency toward both Haw-
thorne and anchoring effects, showing inflated val-
ues immediately following an intervention and
then slowly falling values as perceptions return to
baseline.
Ask Patients about Unexpected Events in Tele-
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phone Follow-up. The addition of a few ques-
tions modifies regular quality assurance telephone
follow-up to include patient safety. For example:
• Did anything happen after your visit that you
did not expect? What?
• Did you experience unexpected discomfort fol-
lowing your visit?
• Did you have any problems with the medica-
tions prescribed or given to you in the ED?
• Did you visit another ED after your visit to our
ED?
Asking these questions will serve as an alert to
possible error and give an indication of what pa-
tients see as unexpected events.
Ask Primary Care Physicians about Unexpected
Events in Patient Follow-up. This might be im-
plemented in either of two ways. The simpler
method is to place a notice at the top of patient
dictations or charts sent to primary care physi-
cians asking the doctors to ‘‘Please inform us if, in
your follow-up, there are any unexpected or un-
usual events associated with this patient’s emer-
gency department visit. Please let us know of any
drug reactions or complications of therapy deliv-
ered in the ED.’’ This will require someone to field,
record, and sort any responses.
A second method entails generating a monthly
list of patient names for each primary care physi-
cian with patients seen in the ED that month. This
list would be mailed, e-mailed, or faxed to the doc-
tor with a request similar to that above. While re-
quiring more concerted effort, this second method
delivers the question to the primary care physician
after any adverse events have had time to appear
and so may yield a higher response rate.
Use a Broad and Inclusive Language of Medical
Error. The vocabulary of medical error is still
forming. Furthermore, the term ‘‘error’’ itself may
be taken as judgmental or accusatory. Without be-
ing able to recommend a specific approach because
different language may work in different situa-
tions and because it is not clear what approach to
recommend, many terms should be considered and
tried. Vocabulary for referring to error includes:
mistakes, unintended injuries, unexpected events,
patient safety, adverse events, barriers to care, and
hindrances to care.
Teaching.
Include Medical Error and Patient Safety in EM
Curricula. Medical error and patient safety are
rarely discussed explicitly during medical school or
residency. The orientation day of any new rotation
is an ideal time to discuss the expectations of the
rotation regarding error. Topics to include are:
• The necessity of asking questions if unsure
about a procedure or an order.
• What to do if one makes a mistake while in the
ED.
• What to do if one witnesses another person mak-
ing a mistake in the ED.
• Basic teamwork concepts, including introducing
oneself and verbally confirming orders.
• The role of incident reports and expectations re-
garding the completion of incident reports.
A discussion covering these topics should be added
to orientation handbooks provided at the begin-
ning of EM rotations.
In order to make thinking about error a more
integral part of EM rotations, rather than simply
something heard or read about during an orienta-
tion, time should be set aside for an M & M-type
conference devoted to system-level analysis of
medical error. Appendix B contains a preliminary
copy of a guide for use in such a conference. In
order to separate this discussion from student or
resident concerns about grading, this conference
should be conducted by someone without respon-
sibility for student evaluation.
Educate Broadly about Error in Medicine and Ef-
forts to Prevent Error. Public discussion has
only recently focused on the topic of error in med-
icine. With the exception of occasional reports
about the most shocking errors, such as wrong-
sided surgery, the public receives little information
about mistakes occurring in hospitals. This may
change with publication of newspaper features like
Tye’s series on medical error in recent issues of The
Boston Globe.119
Revealing the existence of error in one’s own
hospital is risky. Without public realization that
uncovering error is an essential first step to pre-
venting error, one may unwittingly portray one’s
own hospital as dangerous. On the other hand, to
ignore the growing public exposure of error in hos-
pitals risks finding that others, having admitted to
the problem, can trumpet interventions. To the de-
gree that quality is the basis for health care com-
petition—a highly debatable proposition as cost
appears to be far more important—those who have
worked to reduce hospital error, and who have
made their efforts known, will reap due rewards.
The challenge is to raise awareness without fright-
ening patients. An appropriate approach would
emphasize ‘‘patient safety’’ and the efforts made to
ensure appropriate and accurate care. In order to
develop a culture of safety, it is essential that staff,
too, are included in the educational effort.
Prevention. Avoiding harm has always been cen-
tral to medicine, but it has not always shared
equal attention with efficiency, education, and cost
reduction.120 Moreover, system design has played a
much smaller role than individual responsibility in
preventing error. Any intervention explicitly de-
1216 PATIENT SAFETY Schenkel • PREVENTION OF MEDICAL ERRORS
signed to reduce error, and particularly any sys-
tem-level intervention, plays a dual role: it directly
aids care and it indirectly supports the develop-
ment of a safety culture.
Emphasize Patient Safety, Not Just Adverse
Drug Events. The majority of safety research in
medicine focuses on adverse drug events. While re-
ducing adverse drug events is one important piece
of a larger effort to make EDs safer places, such
reduction may be seen as the first, targeted strat-
egy in a larger effort. A broader emphasis on pa-
tient safety leaves the way open for a second tar-
geted strategy after successful efforts to reduce
adverse drug events.
Implement Computer Order Entry. Bates et al.
uncovered 1.4 medication errors per admission on
inpatient units. Less than 1% led to adverse drug
events, but a system of computer order entry
would have prevented all of these.22 While devel-
opment of computer order entry is expensive, pre-
vention of a single adverse drug event represents
an estimated savings of $2,595, and possibly as
much as $4,685, in hospital charges.5
Hennepin County Medical Center has reported
the successful implementation of a computer order
entry system (EmSTAT, WebMentors, Plainfield,
IL), combined with a patient tracking system, in
the ED.121 Color-coded timers on a tracking board
indicate when an order is in need of cosigning, out-
standing, in process, or completed. An additional
benefit of the system has been to provide data for
process analysis. Unanticipated difficulties in im-
plementation included reduced communication be-
tween physicians and nurses and difficulty cancel-
ing orders.
Computer order entry is a first step. Ultimately,
all stages of drug and laboratory processing will be
linked seamlessly. From drug order entry, for ex-
ample, the computer will track, most likely
through bar-coding, the dispensing of the drug
and, ultimately, the administration of that drug to
the appropriate patient. Any place where there is
a bar-code reader, the order will be confirmed. Or-
der confirmation at the bedside will automatically
generate a precise record of medication delivery.
One downside to this innovation lies in the
trust of the computerized system. Increased reli-
ance on automation can lead to lax human opera-
tors. Errors that would be caught by hand may slip
through when people assume that the computer
cannot err.122
Develop a Computer-based Patient Tracking Sys-
tem. Emergency department staff cite tracking
patients as a principal safety concern.123 The
method of writing patient names and locations on
a dry-erase board cannot keep pace with a busy
ED. Other methods of patient tracking should be
considered.
Computer monitoring systems are one possible
solution. A number are commercially available.124
St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island has de-
scribed a patient tracking system using bar code
technology that integrates patient registration, lo-
cation, and waiting times.125 A designated nurse or
secretary keeps logged patient information up-to-
date. Patient ID cards with medical record num-
bers rendered as bar codes allow fast and accurate
access to records. The use of a slot reader speeds
laboratory and radiograph ordering. In the early
1990s, the reported equipment costs for the system
totaled $8,000. Bar code technology has also been
noted to decrease redundant labeling in laboratory
ordering and to increase the accuracy of history
taking in trauma resuscitations.126,127
Enact Smaller Changes Where Possible. An in-
creased focus on patient safety and error reduction
will produce a number of ideas that can be judged
on their own merits and implemented as appro-
priate. With measures of error available, as dis-
cussed above, small changes may demonstrate a
measurable effect in patient safety. Additional
ideas include:
• Moving IV mixing to the central pharmacy, a
more controlled environment.
• Marking all nonstandard IV mixes with bright
red tape.
• Relabeling and repackaging as necessary to dis-
tinguish high-risk drugs or mixtures.
• Automatically delivering discharge summaries
for all hospitalized patients to the admitting EPs.
Topics for Further Investigation.
Investigate Patient Opinions Regarding Medical
Error. Very little knowledge exists about what
patients know or imagine about medical error. This
is not a topic typically included with patient sat-
isfaction surveys. To the degree that patient opin-
ion may drive or direct change in medicine, patient
safety might become a quality indicator leading
people to select a given health plan or hospital.
Surveys, even if conducted in the ED while people
are waiting, may help determine the patient point
of view.
Determine the Best Practices in Patient Safety
in EDs. Observations and interviews of ED staff
may uncover a number of processes that might be
considered best practices in error prevention and
patient safety. These might include overreading
and follow-up of electrocardiograms and radio-
graphs, review of abnormal lab values, written ori-
entation material for students and rotating resi-
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dents, the use of nursing communication notes at
shift change, and standardized order sets for spe-
cific high-risk pathology. In all likelihood, a num-
ber of EDs around the country have practices in
place that could generate significant reductions in
error if instituted, tested, combined, and promul-
gated.
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APPENDIX B
Preventing Error and Promoting Patient Safety in the Emergency Department:
A Guide for System Analysis
continued
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